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By Electronic Filing 
July 9, 2012 
The Honorable James R. Holbein 
Secretary, U.S. International Trade Commission 
500 E Street, S.W. 
Washington, DC 20436 
 
Re: In the Matter of Certain Wireless Communications Devices, Portable Music and Data 
Processing Devices, Computers, and Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-745 
 
SUBMISSION OF 19 ECONOMICS AND LAW PROFESSORS 
The Statute Requires the ITC To Consider Competitive Conditions and Consumers 
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) states: “If the Commission determines, as a result of an 
investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct 
that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this 
section, be excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after considering the 
effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in 
the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the 
United States, and United States consumers, it finds that such articles should not be 
excluded from entry.”1 Congress intended public interest considerations to be 
“paramount” to the statute’s administration. S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 
193 (1974).2 Under Commission Order, administrative law judges of the ITC now may 
take evidence on the public interest at the outset of a case, rather than waiting until the 
end.3   
Our Qualifications To Talk about Competitive Conditions and Consumers 
In this submission, we consider one aspect of Section 337 (d)(1): the impact of 
excluding products that practice standards-essential patents (SEPs) on competitive 
conditions and United States consumers.4 We have studied patent and competition 
policy for years, and in some cases decades. Collectively we have published over 100 
scholarly articles, casebooks, treatises, and book chapters, on the subjects of standards, 
                                                          
1
   19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). 
2
  The Senate Report further reads: “Should the Commission find that issuing an exclusion order would 
have a greater adverse impact on the public health and welfare; on competitive conditions in the United 
States economy; on production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States; or on the 
United States consumer, than would be gained by protecting the patent holder [] then [an] [] exclusion 
order should not be issued.” S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1974). 
3
   Rules of Adjudication and Enforcement, 19 CFR Part 210, 76 Fed. Reg. 64803 (Oct. 19, 2011) available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/rules/finalrules210.pdf. 
4
  In so doing, we take no position on Questions 1-6 of the Request for Written Submissions, which ask 
about the particulars of this case.  
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competition policy, patent remedies, patent licensing, administrative law, and the 
International Trade Commission. 
We provide these views as teachers and scholars of economics, antitrust and 
intellectual property, remedies, administrative, and international intellectual property 
law, former Department of Justice lawyers and chief economists, a former executive 
official at the Patent and Trademark Office, a former counsel at the ITC Office of the 
General Counsel, and a former Member of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers.  
The ITC Should Not Grant Exclusion Orders Based on SEPs Subject to RAND 
Commitments 
Some of us have been called “pro-competition”; others among us have been 
accused of being “pro-patent.” However, we all agree that ITC exclusion orders5 
generally should not be granted under § 1337(d)(1) on the basis of patents subject to 
obligations to license on “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (RAND) terms.  Doing so 
would undermine the significant pro-competitive and pro-consumer benefits that RAND 
promises produce and the investments they enable. A possible exception may arise if 
district court jurisdiction is lacking, the patent is valid and infringed, and the public 
interest favors issuing an exclusion order. We explain our position below.   
SEPs Subject to RAND Commitments Differ from Other Patents 
The Federal Circuit has said that “Congress intended injunctive relief to be the 
normal remedy for a Section 337 violation.”6 However, the Federal Circuit has also 
repeatedly stated that "the Commission has broad discretion in selecting the form, 
scope, and extent of the remedy.”7 Furthermore, a unique set of factors comes into play 
for SEPs that are subject to RAND commitments. Holders of SEPs put aside their rights to 
exclude when they agree to make their technology available on terms that are 
reasonable and non-discriminatory and imply that legal remedies (i.e. monetary 
damages) are adequate.8 Through their promises, patent holders have traded the right 
to exclude for the privilege of being declared essential to the standard.  
Having a patent declared standards-essential benefits the patent holder. Broadly-
adopted standards like Wi-Fi get implemented in thousands of products sold to 
                                                          
5
 And ITC cease and desist orders, the grant of which are governed by § 1337(f)(1). 
6
 Spansion, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010). cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 758, 181 L. Ed. 2d 482 (U.S. 2011). 
7
 Hyundai Electronics Industries Co., Ltd. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
citing Viscofan, S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 787 F.2d 544, 548 (Fed.Cir.1986). 
8
 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (a plaintiff must demonstrate the 
inadequacy of legal remedies before a court may grant injunctive relief). 
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hundreds of millions of consumers, in many cases earning large royalty streams. Failure 
to be included in a standard, in contrast, can relegate a technology to irrelevance. 
Knowing this, patent owners are often willing to provide standards setting organizations 
(SSOs) with RAND commitments and lobby for the privilege to do so,9 even though the 
standards setting process may be painstaking and slow.10 Indeed, royalty-free or RAND 
licensing of standard-essential patents is required by many of the major standards 
bodies including American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which administers and 
coordinates US private sector standards among 100,000 companies, and the European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI), which sponsors the development of 
European telecommunications standards among more than 700 members.11  
Critically, SEPs cannot, by definition, be designed around without sacrificing 
compliance with the standard. This makes them different than non-SEP patents that, if 
they cover minor features, can be designed around without sacrificing key functionality.  
While inventing around does not eliminate the danger of patent hold-up, it does provide 
a check on the bargaining power wielded by patent holders that seek injunctive relief. 
This check is much weaker when the patents are standards-essential. There, disabling 
even a single feature to avoid infringement of an SEP can greatly detract from the value 
of a product by making it inoperable for its intended purpose, for example, a laptop that 
cannot connect to a Wi-Fi network. Furthermore, many consumers, counting on 
standards to provide the functionality they require, are unwilling to purchase non-
compliant products.  An exclusion order that forces manufacturers to produce non-
compliant products would undermine the network effects associated with successful 
standards and harm consumers. 
Furthermore, hundreds or even thousands of patents can read on a single standard, 
especially in the information and communications sector of the economy. In the ETSI 
                                                          
9
 Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents and Hold-Up, 74 Antitrust L.J. 603, 606 (2007). 
10
 Discussed, e.g. in Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?, in 
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 85 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001), and 
Timothy Simcoe, Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared Technology Platforms, 
102 American Economic Review 305 (2012). 
11
 Guidelines for Implementation of the ANSI Patent Policy (February 2011), ANSI Essential Requirements, 
at Section II and available at  
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standa
rds/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/Guidelines%20for%20Implementation%20of%20ANSI%20P
atent%20Policy%202011.pdf; ETSI’s IPR Policy (Nov. 30, 2011), at Annex 6 available at 
http://www.etsi.org/website/aboutetsi/iprsinetsi/iprsinetsi.aspx. See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1889, 1906 (2002) (finding that 29 
out of the 36 standard-setting organizations studied with policies required RAND licensing, another 6 
required outright assignment and three others suggested but did not require FRAND licensing). See also 
Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner, and Jean Tirole, The Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: An Empirical 
Analysis, 38 RAND Journal of Economics 905. 
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standard setting organization, patent owners have declared more than 750 unique 
patent families as essential to the GSM cellular standard, more than 1,600 as essential 
to the third-generation UMTS cellular standard, and more 500 as essential to the fourth 
generation LTE cellular standard.12  More than 900 patents have been declared to be 
essential to the MPEG-2 standard for encoding digital video and audio, including over 
100 US patents.13  
This situation – which is common to SEPs – gives owners of SEPs undue bargaining 
leverage if they are permitted to obtain injunctions, because the inability to practice 
even a single SEP will result in the product being noncompliant. As a result, the 
bargaining leverage of patents covering minor aspects of the standard far outweighs 
their contribution.14 The Federal Trade Commission has reached this same conclusion, 
based on reasoning very similar to ours.15 
Excluding Products that Practice SEPs Adversely Impacts Competitive Conditions and 
Consumers  
19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) does not compel the Commission to grant exclusion orders. 
Rather, it empowers the ITC to evaluate whether or not an exclusion order is in the 
public interest, and to proceed accordingly. The Federal Circuit parses the statute to 
identify four separate factors.16  “The enumerated public interest factors include: (1) the 
public health and welfare; (2) competitive conditions in the United States economy; (3) 
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States; and (4) United 
States consumers.”17 On the three occasions that the ITC has declined to enter an 
injunction,18 its focus has been on two factors: the public interest in health and welfare 
and the unavailability of alternatives. We use these precedents to inform our 
                                                          
12 K. Blind et al., Study on the Interplay between Standards and Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), Tender 
No ENTR/09/015 (OJEU S136 of 18/07/2009) Final Report, April 2011. 
13
 MPEG LA, MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License Briefing (Aug. 4, 2010); See also Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That 
Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools, 77 Antitrust Law Journal No. 1,  13 (2010). 
14
 See Farrell, et. al, supra, Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Texas 
Law Review 1991, Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties (2010), 12 American Law and 
Economics Review 218; See also Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Royalty Negotiations by Standard 
Development Organizations, 77 Antitrust Law Journal 855 (2011). 
15
 United States Federal Trade Commission Statement on the Public Interest, Inv. No. 337-TA-745. (June 
2012) 
16
   See Spansion, 629 F.3d at 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
17
   Id. 
18
 See Opinion of Vice Chairman Alberger and Commissioners Bedell and Stern In re Certain Automatic 
Crankpin Grinders at 17-18, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-60 (Dec. 17, 1979); Commission Action and Order In re 
Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes at 22-31, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-67, (Dec. 29 1980); Commission 
Memorandum Opinion In re Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus and Components Thereof, at 1-2, 
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-182, 337-TA-188, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1211, 1984 WL 63741 (Oct. 5, 1984). 
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description below of how competitive conditions and consumers are particularly 
impacted when the use of SEPs is withheld through an exclusion order.  
First, companies count on the availability of standards-essential technology to make 
significant investments. Electronics manufacturers spend hundreds of millions of dollars 
on fabrications plants that can make products compatible with a standard such as the 
IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network protocol. Comparable sums are spent in the 
information and communications sector to design and build products that comply with 
various product standards. The companies making these investments depend on their 
ability to license any technology necessary to comply with these standards on 
reasonable terms. They typically become “locked-in” to the standard, meaning that a 
significant portion of their investments would be rendered uneconomic if they were 
blocked from producing standards-compliant products.   
If the ITC were generally to allow RAND-obligated patents to be used as the basis of 
injunctions, this would undermine the basic bargain RAND commitments represent. 
Industry participants would be less willing to make the investments needed to design 
and build standards-compliant products, due to the risk they will later be unable to 
make and sell those products. A clear statement from the ITC that it will generally 
refrain from issuing exclusion orders for SEPs, in contrast, will increase certainty for 
firms making investments in complementary technology.19 
Second, these investments promote competition and inure to the benefit of United 
States consumers.20 There are an estimated 700,000 standards and technical regulations 
around the world, and 450 standards setting organizations in the United States alone. 21  
Without these organizations and the standards they develop, the Internet would not 
work, phones could not talk to each other, and it would be harder to buy printer 
paper.22 Standards facilitate network effects – the more devices that can read my text 
messages, the more valuable my text messages become. Open standards enable greater 
                                                          
19 
Federal Trade Commission, supra at 5. 
20
 For a thoughtful recent statement describing how standards promote competition and generate 
substantial benefits to consumers, while elevating the dangers of patent holdup, see the February 13, 
2012 Statement by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division regarding its decision to close its 
investigations into several transactions involving SEPs, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/280190.htm. It closed these investigations in part 
based on commitments not to seek injunctions in disputes involving SEPs. However, citing “more 
ambiguous statements that do not provide the same direct confirmation,” the Division stated that it 
“continues to have concerns about the potential inappropriate use of SEPs to disrupt competition and will 
continue to monitor the use of SEPs in the wireless device industry.”  
21
 Report to the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) prepared by FIPRA International, October 
2010, pp.3, 12 and available at 
http://www.ert.eu/sites/default/files/Standard%20setting%20in%20a%20changing%20global%20landsca
pe%20Final%20Report_0.pdf. 
22
 Lemley, supra at 1892. 
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competition in interoperable products and services. 23 A lack of standardization, in 
contrast, can leave a consumer “stranded” - as anyone who has forgotten the charge 
cord for their mobile phone can attest.  
Proprietary formats can lead to greater market power when the technology is not 
made available to all comers.24 Undoing the standards bargain through an exclusion 
order may leave consumers who have already bought the product stranded, unable to 
get support or services for products already purchased.25 
Furthermore, issuing an order to exclude standards-compliant products would have 
consequences not only on individual respondents but also on third parties – for 
example, service providers, application developers, and other members of the 
ecosystem of the enjoined product.26 The larger the market for the enjoined product, 
the greater the collateral impact. 
Finally, we are mindful of several other relevant sources of authority. One is the 
Federal Trade Commission’s official comment on issues of public interest in this case.27 
Similar to the present comment, it urges the ITC to consider the “[h]igh switching costs 
combined with the threat of an exclusion order could allow a patentee to obtain 
unreasonable licensing terms despite its RAND commitment…because implementers are 
locked into practicing the standard.” 28 Agencies don’t often comment publicly in ITC 
cases,29 giving the FTC’s statement additional significance.  The Department of Justice 
has also publicly expressed its concern about the use of RAND patents to seek 
                                                          
23
 Shapiro, supra at 89-90. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. at 72, 79-84. 
26
   See Certain Baseband Processors, p. 153 (“The potential harm to economic actors, in this case 
including handset manufacturers and telecommunications service providers, is properly part of our 
EPROMs analysis, and we have indeed fully weighed potential harm to third parties and to legitimate 
trade in that prior analysis.  In fact, under our EPROMs analysis, we found that full downstream relief was 
not permitted in this investigation due to, among other things, the magnitude of the impact on third 
parties.”) (ultimately concluding “a downstream remedy with a grandfathering exception does not raise 
public interest concerns” because “the relief we propose has a much more limited impact on availability 
of 3G-capable handsets, and thus a lesser impact on the public interest.”) (see also id. at 153-154).  
27
 United States Federal Trade Commission Statement on the Public Interest, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (June 
2012). 
28
 Id. at 3. 
29 Based on a search of EDIS, the ITC’s electronic docketing system and related research. Politicians have 
sent letters on behalf of their constituents to the ITC. See generally Colleen Chien, Publicly Influencing the 
ITC (unpublished paper, on file with the author). 19 USC 1337 (b)(2) requires the ITC to consult with 
governmental departments and agencies “as it considers appropriate.” According to the legislative 
history, the requirement of these consultations reflects Congress’ “[belief] that the public health and 
welfare and the assurance of competitive conditions in the United States economy must be the overriding 
considerations in the administration of this statute.” S. Rep. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1974).   
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injunctions.30 The President has made several statements about the importance of 
wireless technologies for consumers and the national economy.31 In previous cases 
when the ITC has declined to award or has tailored an exclusion order, it has relied upon 
such official comment and agency, Presidential and Congressional policy to explain its 
position.32  
In addition, the statute’s legislative history addresses opportunistic behavior by 
patent holders. It cautions against using the statute to reward such behavior, noting 
that an “exclusion order should not be issued…particularly in cases where there is 
evidence of price gouging or monopolistic practices in the domestic industry.” S. Rep. 
No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1974).  
Money Damages, not Injunctions, are the Appropriate Remedy for SEPs Subject to 
RAND Commitments 
In short, though standards create value by facilitating interoperability and enabling 
competition in complementary products to thrive, they increase the vulnerability of 
standards implementers to patent holdup. RAND promises counter these concerns. 
They reassure companies that they will not be held up, but rather will be able to access 
the required technologies on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.  
Holders of SEPs who have promised to license their patents on reasonable terms 
should not generally be allowed to obtain injunctions against products that comply with 
the standard. Regardless of the respondent specifics referred to in Question 7 of the 
Request for Written Submissions, the patentee has received the benefit of the bargain 
by having their patented technology included in the standard. In return, they are 
obligated to license their patent on RAND terms. Allowing holders of SEPs to obtain 
injunctions would give the RAND licensing obligation an implicit “unless we don’t feel 
like it” clause that would render the commitment virtually meaningless.  
                                                          
30
 See February 13, 2012 Statement by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, supra. 
31
 See Verizon Statement on the Public Interest, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (June 2012). 
32
 See Commission Action and Order In re Certain Inclined-Field Acceleration Tubes at 21, USITC Inv. No. 
337-TA-67, (Dec. 29 1980) (citing in support of its decision to not grant an order enjoining Dowlish tubes 
used for research, “the President and the Congress have issued declarations of support for basic science 
research,” and  “[t]he National Science Foundation Act” (in this case the NSF submitted a comment); 
Opinion of Vice Chairman Alberger and Commissioners Bedell and Stern In re Certain Automatic Crankpin 
Grinders at 17-18, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-60, 205 U.S.P.Q. 71, 0079 WL 419349 (Dec. 17, 1979)(justifying 
the Commission’s decision not to exclude efficient crankpin grinders in part by “the fact that Congress and 
the President have also clearly established a policy requiring automotive companies to increase the fuel 
economy of the automobiles they produce.”); See also Commission Decision in Certain Baseband 
Processor (TA-337-543), where the ITC custom tailored the injunction it ordered, and cited the public 
comments of FEMA and the FCC. 
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Patent owners may legitimately worry that without the threat of an injunction, 
infringers will turn down reasonable offers. We are sympathetic to these concerns. 
However, district courts are in a better position to deal with them by imposing 
attorneys' fee sanctions for bad behavior or enhanced damages in certain situations.33 
District courts also can issue injunctions, even for SEPs subject to RAND commitments, if 
the equities favor doing so.  
Exceptions to the Rule and Injunction Tailoring  
As one of us has written elsewhere: “[t]here is at least one situation where an ITC 
action and exclusion order on the basis of a RAND patent may be appropriate, however. 
[] In the cases when the district court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant but the in rem 
jurisdiction of the ITC is available, 34 the ITC provides the patentee with its only 
recourse.” 35  In such cases, ITC review and relief may be appropriate, provided that the 
other prerequisites to relief have been met.  However, it may well be the case that even 
if the ITC is the only venue in which relief is available, an exclusion order is still not 
appropriate due to the failure to meet public interest or other prerequisites. 
If the ITC decides to issue injunctions based on SEPs subject to RAND commitments, 
we urge the Commission to consider tailoring its order to minimize harm to the public 
interest, for example through delay or grandfathering. Delaying injunctions can address 
certain holdup problems. Faced with the threat of an exclusion order, the respondent 
will sometimes design around the standard even if it means disabling standards 
essential functionality.36 But if the patent is found invalid or not infringed, the effort will 
have been wasted.37 Delaying the exclusion order reduces investment in unnecessary 
design-arounds and gives competitors time to adjust.38 Grandfathering existing models 
can also help consumers, at a minimal cost to the patentee. Thus, in Certain Baseband 
Processors, the Commission adjusted the scope of the exclusion order by grandfathering 
                                                          
33
 Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the 
Firm, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 351, 390 (2007). 
34 65% of ITC cases have a district court counterpart, suggesting that this isn’t a problem in the majority of 
cases, since the ITC and district court both have the power to hear the case. See Colleen Chien, Patently 
Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 63, 64 (2008). 
35
 Colleen Chien & Mark Lemley, Patents, Holdup, and the ITC __Cornell Law. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), at 
53, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856608. 
36
 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra at 2002. 
37
 See id. at 2002, n. 71. 
38
 See id. at 2038, Commission Decision in Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices TA-337-
710, at 81.  (“T-Mobile itself has advised the Commission that a four-month transition period would likely 
be sufficient . . . . We find T-Mobile’s suggestion to be reasonable and within our authority to 
implement.”).   
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in existing models of handsets.”39 Likewise, in Personal Data and Mobile 
Communications Devices, the Commission grandfathered refurbished replacement 
handsets into its exclusion order.40  In Sortation Systems41 and Transmission Trucks,42 
the ITC exempted from its exclusion order spare parts to service existing systems and 
facilities, citing public interest.  
Responses to Questions 8-13 
In sum, we believe that ITC relief should generally not be granted under §1337(d)(1) 
on the basis of patents subject to RAND commitments.43 A possible exception arises in 
cases where district court relief is unavailable due to a lack of jurisdiction and the patent 
is valid, infringed, and public interest favors granting relief. In the rare case where an ITC 
exclusion order is appropriate, the ITC should make use of its remedial flexibilities, 
including grandfathering and delay, to minimize harm to competition and U.S. 
consumers. 
Applying these principles to the Commission’s specific questions,44 we believe that 
the answer to Question 8 is “affirmative”: a RAND obligation should generally preclude 
issuance of an exclusion order, except as we have described. The addition of the 
patentee's unwillingness to offer or license their RAND obligated patents as 
contemplated by Questions 9-12, or a failed negotiation as contemplated by Question 
13, should not change this result. The patentee has committed to making the 
technology available on RAND terms, and received the benefit of that bargain. If the 
respondent fails to accept an offer made to them that has been determined by a 
                                                          
39
  Commission Decision in Certain Baseband Processors Inv. No. 337-TA-543, supra at 150. 
40
  Commission Decision in Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices 337-TA-710, supra at 83.  
(“HTC shall be permitted to import into the United States [for 19 months] . . . refurbished handsets to be 
provided to consumers as replacements.”). 
41
 Certain Sortation Systems, Parts Thereof, and Products Containing Same; Notice of Violation of Section 
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Issuance of Limited Exclusion Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 5047 (Jan. 31, 2003) 
(“The Commission determined to include an exemption in the limited exclusion order for importations 
of spare parts for United Parcel Service’s Hub 2000 facility in Louisville, Kentucky.”).  
42
 Certain Automated Mechanical Transmission Systems for Medium-Duty and Heavy-Duty Trucks, and 
Components Thereof, Termination of Investigation; Issuance of a Limited Exclusion Order and a Cease and 
Desist Order, at 3, EDIS Doc. ID. 228343, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-503 (Apr. 7, 2005) (“The limited exclusion 
order does not cover parts necessary to service infringing automated mechanical transmission systems 
installed on trucks prior to the issuance of the order.”). 
43
  Though the question of whether relief should be relief on the basis of SEPs not subject to FRAND is 
beyond the scope of the ITC’s request, we note that many of the same impacts to consumers and 
competitive conditions discussed in this comment also extend to this situation.   
44
   As discussed above at note 2 we take no position on Questions 1-6 which ask about this specific 
investigation or otherwise do not implicate public interest concerns. Question 7 is addressed supra at the 
top of page 6. 
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suitable fact finder to be RAND, district court damages, sanctions, and/or injunctions 
may be appropriate. 
We thank the Commission for the opportunity to comment on these important 
issues.  
Respectfully Submitted,
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